Der Capo der Mafia in Bosnien Fahrudin Radoncic, ist nun Innenminister

Posted on Juni 6, 2012 von

2



„State Capture“: Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro, Bulgaria

Avaz Twist TowerFahrudin Radonicic

Heute gilt Radončić als reichster Mann seines Landes und wird auch „Bosniens Donald Trump“ genannt.

gangster are coming under scrutiny.

Elvira Jukic

BIRN

SarajevoThe alleged relationship of Fahrudin Radoncic, owner of Bosnia’s most read daily, Dnevni avaz, to a suspected criminal has come under the spotlight following his acceptance of the post of Security Minister.

The current Security Minister, Sadik Ahmetovic, is to be dismissed following the collapse of the coalition of his party, the Party of Democratic Action, SDA, with the Social Democrats.

Instead the Social Democrats are forming a coalition with Radoncic’s party, the Alliance for the Better Future of Bosnia, SBB.

Ahmetovic recalled the fact that his successor’s alleged friend, Naser Kelmendi, was on a US blacklist as an alleged drug-trafficker.

Bosnia’s Center for Investigative Journalism, CIN, in its data base on Kelmendi, names Radoncic as his main business associate.

CIN first reported on the business relationships between Kelmendi and Radoncic in 2009.

According to CIN, Kelmendi, born in Kosovo, but with Bosnian citizenship, and his three sons, Elvis, Liridon and Besnik, along with his brother Becir, runs several businesses in Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo, including hotels and a trucking company.

He is suspected of leading one of the biggest crime rings in the Balkans and of trafficking drugs to Europe through the Balkans.

CIN said his business ties to Radoncic were conducted throughout Radoncic’s publishing company, Avaz, with which he exchanged real estate in Zenica and Sarajevo, while Avaz bought an armoured vehicle from Kelmendi.

The editor of CIN, Azhar Kalamujic, who published the story in 2009, told Balkan Insight that businesses ties between the two men had been proven, though Radoncic has denied to CIN having had any contacts with Kelmendi.

A 2008 report by the Bosnian State Investigative and Protection Agency, SIPA, which CIN used in its research, described Kelmendi as the head of one of the best organized criminal organizations in the region, allegedly smuggling drugs and cigarettes, trafficking in people and laundering money.

Although Kelmendi was indicted numerous times in Bosnia, he has never been prosecuted.

In the Canton of Sarajevo alone at least 13 criminal complaints have been filed between 2005 and 2009 against Kelmendi and his sons Elvis, Liridon and Besnik.

Members of the Kelmendi family have been charged with unauthorized possession of weapons, murder and attempted murder.

In 1976 by the District Court in Pec, Kosovo, Naser Kelmendi was sentenced to a prison term of 18 months for attempted murder….Balkaninsight.com

Immer dreister werden überall die Verbrecher, welche ganze Wirtschaften und Staaten kontrollieren im Balkan

FBI Weighs in on Balkan Organised Crime

21/11/2003

An FBI statement before a US Senate Committee in October assessed the organised crime situation in the Balkans.

By Dimitris Agrafiotis for Southeast European Times in Athens – 21/11/03

Organised crime in the Balkans has attracted the interest of the American law enforcement community and the US Senate. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) believes that crime from the Balkans, Eastern and Central Europe, and the former Soviet Union is expanding and will continue to expand.

„In the last year or two, European nations have recognised that Balkan organised crime is one of the greatest criminal threats that they face,“ Assistant Director of the FBI Criminal Investigative Division Grant D. Ashley said in an October statement before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

He added that European police organisations estimate that Balkan crime rings now control more than 70 per cent of the heroin market in some of the larger European nations, and are rapidly taking over human smuggling, prostitution and car theft rings across Europe.
………, Albanian organised crime has reached the United States, creating partnerships with the Gambino, Genovese, and Luchese families to facilitate specific crimes.……………….

Setimes

siehe auch FBI Bericht an den US Kongress:
FBI Press Room – Congressional Statement – 2003 – Statement of Grant
D. Ashley
November 2003 Volume
72 Number 11
United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress03/ashley103003.htm
1 Ausmass des Mafia-Problems
Gemäss dem bosnischen Innenminister Muhidin Ali und dem Institute for War and
Peace Reporting (IWPR) stellt das organisierte Verbrechen die grösste Bedrohung
und das bedeutendste Sicherheitsrisiko für den bosnischen Staat dar.
3
Der Umsatz
der Mafia sei bereit höher als das bosnische Staatsbudget.
4
In einem Bericht des US
National Intel ligence Council wird befürchtet, die Mafia könnte bis im Jahr 2025
mehrere mittel- und osteuropäische Staaten völlig kontrollieren.
5..
3 Organisation der Mafia
Gemäss einem Bericht der bosnischen Untersuchungs- und Schutzbehörde SIPA
(State Investigation and Protection Agency) sind die Spitzen der bosnischen Mafia
eng mit der stärksten überregionalen, aus dem Kosovo stammenden Mafia unter
Naser Kelmendi verbunden. Führende Kontaktpersonen Kelmendis in Bosnien seien
Naser Oric (bosnischer Armeeführer von Srebrenica), Fahrudin Radoni (Besitzer
des Medienimperiums Avaz und Gründer der politischen Partei «Allianz für eine bes-
ser Zukunft»; zweiter der Wahl zum bosnischen Präsidium in den Wahlen vom
3. Oktober 2010) und Nihad Bojadži (Brigadiergeneral während des Krieges).
10..
www.fluechtlingshilfe.ch

Bosnia: Radoncic Poised To Be A New Player In Bosniak Politics
Origin Embassy Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
Cable time Tue, 9 Feb 2010 12:33 UTC
Classification SECRET//NOFORN
Source http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10SARAJEVO134.html
References 06SARAJEVO2320 , 08SARAJEVO1593 , 09SARAJEVO103 , 09SARAJEVO1139 , 09SARAJEVO226 , 10SARAJEVO110 , 10SARAJEVO61
Referenced by 10SARAJEVO148
History

 

VZCZCXRO9701 RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL DE RUEHVJ #0134/01 0401233 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 091233Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1374 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC XMT AMCONSUL STRASBOURG

Hide header SECRET SECTION 01 OF 04 SARAJEVO 000134 NOFORN SIPDIS EUR/SCE FOR HYLAND, FOOKS NSC FOR HOVENIER EO 12958: DECL: 02/09/2020 TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PINR [Intelligence] , KDEM [Democratization] , BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina] SUBJECT: BOSNIA: RADONCIC POISED TO BE A NEW PLAYER IN BOSNIAK POLITICS REF: A. 06 SARAJEVO 2320 B. 09 SARAJEVO 1139 C. 09 SARAJEVO 226 D. 09 SARAJEVO 103 E. 08 SARAJEVO 1593 F. 09 SARAJEVO 1169 G. SARAJEVO 61 H. SARAJEVO 110 Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary ——- ¶1. (S/NF) The emergence of a new Bosniak party, led by the powerful, reportedly corrupt, and sometimes vindictive media mogul Fahrudin Radoncic, is likely to create further rifts in the Bosniak political scene, particularly amid the campaign for the October 2010 general elections. Radoncic has the support of the leader of the Islamic community. Also, Radoncic’s ownership and direct control of the most widely-read daily newspaper in Bosnia will ensure that his campaign message is well propagated. Radoncic’s reputation for questionable business ventures with partners from across the political spectrum, combined with his likely desire for influence over the judiciary to escape prosecution for corruption, suggests that he will seek political alliances based on lucrative personal prospects, rather than ideology or even ethnic affiliation. Although it is too early to make concrete predictions, Radoncic’s party is poised to capture votes primarily from Haris Silajdzic’s Party for BiH (SBiH), as well as a wide swath of apathetic voters allured by his pledges to fix the economy. End summary. The Man, the Legend ——————- ¶2. (C) Fahrudin Radoncic rose from relative poverty and obscurity after the 1992-95 BiH war to become the founder and owner of Bosnia’s leading publishing company, Avaz Publishing. This company is known especially for its production of the country’s highest-circulation daily newspaper, Dnevni Avaz, but also for a small television news show and a number of widely-read magazines, such as Global. The success of Avaz has given Radoncic significant control of the Bosniak media. Avaz therefore has proven a powerful tool against Radoncic’s opponents, particularly the police authorities investigating his role in corruption scandals. Although not a veteran politician himself, Radoncic through Avaz has played an active role in politics for over a decade, with Bosniak political candidates vying for his media support. Candidates whom Avaz endorses for the Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency — most recently, Party for BiH (SBiH) chairman Haris Silajdzic in 2006 — usually succeed in elections. Radoncic also cultivates wide international ties, and Sead Numanovic, editor-in-chief of Avaz, is one of the most well-connected people in Bosnia. The Scandals ———— ¶3. (S/NF) Radoncic is widely believed to be responsible for corrupt business practices, most notably his role in a scandal involving the Federation Development Bank (FDB) (ref A). Radoncic admitted to having hired Ramiz Dzaferovic — SDA member, director of the FDB — to conduct an audit of Avaz through Dzaferovic’s personal audit company. At the same time, Dzaferovic through the FDB gave Radoncic a loan of KM 22.5 million — which the FDB had allocated for agriculture — for the construction of Radoncic’s Avaz Tower in Sarajevo. Separately, local media recently reported alleged ties between Radoncic and international drug dealer Kelmendi, which led Radoncic to launch a full-scale attack in the pages of Avaz against the police officials working on that case. Also, staff of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) recently linked Radoncic to an international money laundering scheme. This allegation, which was leaked to the press, sparked a smear campaign in Avaz against the Principal Deputy High Representative, a State Department employee on detail to OHR, somewhat belying Radoncic’s claims that one of his priorities will be to SARAJEVO 00000134 002 OF 004 cooperate with the international community. The Entree into Politics ———————— ¶4. (C) In September 2009, Radoncic launched a new Bosniak political party, the Alliance for a Better Future of BiH (SBB-BiH) (ref B). Radoncic is almost certainly seeking political status in order to secure protection from the investigation of his illegal business deals by wielding government influence over the judiciary. Moreover, now may be a personally appealing time for Radoncic to enter politics, as media outlets besides Avaz indicate that Radoncic’s business is struggling and that Avaz’s chief rival daily newspaper, Oslobodjenje, is rapidly catching up to Avaz in its sales. This suggests that the pragmatic Radoncic is entering the political scene to seek lucrative deals wherever he can find them, rather than choosing partners based on ideology or even ethnic affiliation. This approach would make him an appealing ally for Republika Srpska (RS) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, who also dabbles in business and is himself under investigation for corruption. Dodik therefore may see Radoncic as his ideal Bosniak interlocutor. Indeed, Radoncic told the DCM in January that he has met with Dodik, as well as Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)-BiH President Dragan Covic — who has been indicted for corruption and is forging a closer relationship with Dodik (septel) — and has a good relationship with both men. Moreover, the fact that Avaz has kept mostly quiet on the very issue that it could use to galvanize the Bosniak populace ahead of the election — rhetoric on a referendum in the RS — has led to speculation that discussions on a partnership between Dodik and Radoncic may already be underway. The Setbacks ———— ¶5. (S/NF) Despite any possible musings of a deal with Dodik, SBB-BiH appears to be off to a rocky start. Initial polls suggest that the party has a small following, and Radoncic has yet to attract any well-known personalities to join his party. His most notable party member besides himself is former state-level PM and former SDA member Adnan Terzic, although Terzic’s following within SDA was tenuous at best when he left the party. The other big name in SBB-BiH is Haris Basic, a former SDA member whom the Council of Ministers suspended as director of the Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA) due to the BiH Court’s indictment against him for illegally issuing transport licenses. Radoncic also has not yet managed to form a founding party congress despite the high attendance at his kickoff rallies in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, and elsewhere. Also, Radoncic — whose family is rom the Sandzak region in Serbia — carries a stong „Sandzak“ accent when he speaks, which is anathma to many Bosnians. Moreover, he lacks persona charisma and is generally uncomfortable and awkard with interlocutors who are unfamiliar to him. The Weapons ———– ¶6. (S/NF) Despite these initial setbacks, Radoncic’s expectations for electoral success are high. Through public hearings conducted by the BiH parliamentary working group on changes to the election law, Radoncic in January proposed an increase in the threshold for a party’s representation in Parliament from three to five percent at the state and entity level. The parliamentary working group on changes to the election law rejected his proposal. Radoncic’s most powerful weapon during the elections will be Avaz, and he already is using it as an advertising venue for his party. The economy, a major concern for Bosniak voters, is one of Avaz’s key pre-election themes, as well as the incompetence of BiH’s current leadership, particularly Bosniak tri-Presidency member Haris Silajdzic. Amid the country-wide economic crisis, these messages may well resonate with apathetic Bosniak voters. Indeed, Terzic told the DCM that this is one of SBB-BiH’s key target groups in the election campaign. The SBiH Political Vacuum ————————- SARAJEVO 00000134 003 OF 004 ¶7. (C) Radoncic’s entree into the Bosniak political scene will most likely come at the expense of the deteriorating SBiH. SBiH garnered poor results in the 2008 municipal elections, and our SBiH contacts continue to tell us of the disgruntlement within the party with Silajdzic’s poor leadership. Bakir Izetbegovic, who is a friend of Silajdzic, has suggested to us that Silajdzic may in fact be preparing to leave the political scene. Moreover, the Islamic community, which had previously endorsed Silajdzic, now supports Radoncic at the expense of SBiH. Avaz consistently maligns Silajdzic, calling him a „lying President“ and a „mafia godfather“ who steals from the poor. Radoncic also is seeking to fill Silajdzic’s self-proclaimed role as the key Bosniak interlocutor with the USG. For example, his visit to Washington in February to attend the prayer breakfast, as well as his speech at the US Institute of Peace, received widespread press throughout BiH, dwarfing that of the other BiH attendees. The Boost from the Islamic Community ———————————— ¶8. (S/NF) Silajdzic’s victory in the 2006 presidential race stemmed from the same sources Radoncic has at his disposal — Dnevni Avaz and Islamic community head Reis-ul-ulema Mustafa Ceric, whom Avaz quoted almost daily in the run-up to the 2006 elections and who was seen with Silajdzic at a number of important Islamic events (ref C). Although Radoncic is not at all devout, he and Reis Ceric have enjoyed a close relationship for over a year, most likely tied to Radoncic’s gift of one million KM (approximately 714,000 USD) for the construction of the Reis’s headquarters and residence in Sarajevo. Additionally, Reis Ceric is the only public figure whom Avaz has never criticized. Avaz regularly features the Reis on the front page, reports on his travels, and mocks media outlets that criticize him. Avaz even posited a „different interpretation“ of the conviction in February 2009 of an imam in Travnik on charges of pedophilia (ref D). Radoncic openly echoes the Reis’s outcry against „Islamophobia“ (ref E), most recently attacking former editor-in-chief of Federation TV (FTV) Duska Jurisic, who reported on Radoncic’s role in the FDB scandal. Radoncic stated that „we cannot permit a person who is not Muslim to be an editor in our Islamic community.“ Any overt endorsements by Reis Ceric of Radoncic’s party would give Radoncic a boost among religious voters who see Tihic as overly secular; conversely, Radoncic can revel in his irreverent understanding of Islam if he so chooses. SDA Deputy President Asim Sarajlic told us that he overheard the Reis tell Radoncic at a reception, „People need to see you at mosque,“ to which Radoncic allegedly replied, „But Reis, I don’t know any prayers!“ Later, in a theatrical aside during a lunch with DCM, Radoncic held his wine glass aloft and said „I can’t support radical Islam: I would be their first victim!“ The Hurdle: SDA ————— ¶9. (C) Although it is too early to make concrete predictions, at this point it seems that even with the support of the Islamic community, Radoncic will be unlikely to make great gains in these elections at the expense of SDA. SDA has a well-established voting base, particularly in rural and semi-urban areas. Bosniaks considered SDA and its first President, Alija Izetbegovic, the protectors of their people during the war, and the limited success of splinter parties like SBiH in recent elections suggests that Bosniaks choose established parties over charismatic new leaders when they feel threatened (ref F). Even with SBiH’s Tri-Presidency victory in 2006, SDA remained the largest Bosniak party, capturing more seats in both Federation and state legislatures than SBiH. Moreover, although Radoncic wields significant media power, he relies on SDA for financial support, due to SDA’s connections with the FDB. Avaz treats Tihic with caution — including by sidelining Tihic’s repeated, direct attacks on Radoncic — suggesting that Radoncic recognizes the risk in burning bridges with the most powerful Bosniak party. SARAJEVO 00000134 004 OF 004 The Impact: Fractious Bosniak Politics ————————————– ¶10. (S/NF) Although Radoncic treads carefully with SDA, he bears a longstanding animosity with the other major Federation-based party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), stemming largely from his personal dislike of party President Zlatko Lagumdzija. However, Radoncic — genuinely shocking Avaz editor Numanovic, who was also present — told the DCM in January that he had recently met with Lagumdzija for over two hours to discuss a possible post-election coalition, which he may see as a means of sidelining SDA. Nonetheless, Avaz’s consistent disparaging of Lagumdzija and Silajdzic — as well as Radoncic’s ties to the Reis, who also is on the outs with both men — makes it less likely that either party will want to work with Radoncic before or after the elections. These inflammatory comments are likely to increase as the year progresses, which will contribute to a Bosniak campaign that may well be based more on personal attacks than on any potentially unifying issue. A strong showing for Radoncic in the elections would put him in a position to negotiate a place in a post-election coalition. Even if Radoncic serves in opposition, he will become one more strong personality in Bosniak politics that could undermine initiatives from moderate Bosniak parties. Moreover, Radoncic is powerful, due to his business ties and the strong influence of Avaz. He may be able to seriously damage any party inside or outside the coalition that challenges him. As the economic crisis shows no signs of abating, Radoncic could become a greater force, given the hide-bound lethargy and backward-looking politics of many of his Bosniak opponents. Comment ——- ¶11. (S/NF) The collapse of the Prud process (ref G), the political and economic woes in the Federation (ref H), and the battle over the mayor of Mostar (ref I) are recent examples of the extent to which fractious Bosniak politics contribute to paralysis at the state and Federation level. Tihic’s attempts to shore up the state have been held in check by opposition on his right flank — Silajdzic, the Islamic community, and even Lagumdzija, who sees it as his duty as opposition leader to oppose any initiative the ruling coalition supports. If Radoncic succeeds in establishing a foothold in a new government, Tihic will face a more difficult battle in securing a unified Bosniak response to anti-state behavior from the RS and in taking a constructive approach to such initiatives as constitutional reform. Moreover, an alliance between Radoncic and Dodik, perceived as two of the country’s more corrupt leaders, would send a very discouraging message to those in Bosnia and Herzegovina who are seeking the rule of law, especially the Bosniak intellectual elite. Comment Cont’d ————– ¶12. (S/NF) At the same time — however distasteful it may be to us or others — if Radoncic and gains enough authority through the October 2010 elections to join a ruling coalition at the state or Federation level, his comparative lack of discord with RS leaders and pragmatic approach on issues ranging from economic development to constitutional reform and Euro-Atlantic integration could perhaps contribute to a more peaceful political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the near term. ENGLISH

http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10SARAJEVO134

MAFIA-STYLE GANG responsible for killing of deputy minister of internal affairs of Bosnia

Globus, Zagreb, Croatia December 24, 1999

“Globus” uncovers the results of the investigation on the assassination of the deputy minister of internal affairs of the BH Federation which was conducted by international police (IPTF)
MAFIA-STYLE GANG OF BAJRAMOVIC “CELO” SUSPECTED OF MURDERING JOZO LEUTAR

By Denis Kuljis and Mark Cigoj
…………………..

10/28/99 – An unidentified male and his girlfriend traveled to the regional headquarters of IPTF in Tuzla and asked to speak with someone in charge of investigating the Leutar case. Regional commander Stanislav Frolov and chief of operations Eric Ericson spoke with the subject. They informed the commissioner in Sarajevo who further advised the allied forces regarding the situation. Police monitors Barton and Sigfuson left the same day for Tuzla to conduct an interview. The discussion began at 4:00 p.m. in the office of the deputy regional commander. During the conversation the unidentified person informed IPTF regarding the participants in the murder of Leutar.

He was a former member of that gang and was present at the first meeting when the decision was made to kill Leutar. The subject wanted to withdraw from the gang because of disagreement with Ismet Bajramovic “Celo”. The following persons were listed as being present at the meeting at which the murder was planned: Radzo Mahir, Fikret Kajevic, Nijaz Karkelja “Nisko”, Selver Lekic, Ismet Bajramovic “Celo”, Atko, Aco and Mina. They were offered 100,000 German marks apiece to eliminate Leutar. The meeting was held about the middle of March in the “Estrada” caffe bar in Sarajevo which is owned by Celo. The subject emphatically claimed that he was not a participant in the crime. He said that Leutar was in possession of information regarding the illegal activities of Bakir Izetbegovic. During the meeting, he claims, Bakir Izetbegovic communicated with Celo by telephone and Celo put the call on speaker phone. Bakir stressed that he needed Leutar to be eliminated.

DEATH BECAUSE OF A CASSETTE?

In the “Introductory Report on Discussions and Meetings with Arman Jasarevic” which was composed by Charlene Barton and of which “Globus” possesses a photocopy, it is stated: “The main topic of the first meeting, which was held late in the afternoon on March 2nd or 3rd in the “Estrada” caffe was the murder of Jozo Leutar. All members of the gang were present at the meeting. Two of Celo’s bodyguards were also present but outside the room where the meeting took place, as was Celo’s secretary and girlfriend, Mina. He told us that Celo advised the gang that they would get 500,000 German marks for the murder of Jozo Leutar. During the meeting, Bakir Izetbegovic telephoned Celo and talked about the murder of Leutar. Celo put Bakir on speaker phone to confirm the amount of money and Bakir Izetbegovic said that he would get 500,000 German marks for the murder. Bakir said: “Get this guy off my dick.”

Balkanpeace

Die Super Mafia im Balkan des Naser Kelmendi Clans aus dem Kosovo

 

Der Kelmendi Clan gehört zu den grössten Verbrecher Clans des Balkan und eine Verwandte ist sogar Gerichts Dolmetscherin in Deutschland. Eng verbunden mit der Deutschen Politik (vor allem um Joschka Fischer und die SPD), mit Hashim Thaci und Ekrem Luka und zentrale Figur und Haupt Financier für jedes Verbrechen im Balkan und im Kosovo. Der Kelmendi Clan vermittelte auch Hunderte von Dolmetscherin u.a. für die Deutsche Bundeswehr und das diese Personen aus der OK kommen war im Sommer 1999, für jeden Bundeswehr Offizier offensichtlich. Wie die IEP Militär Studie in 2007, ist praktisch von Beginn an, inkusive der NATO – KFOR Stäbe* Alles von der Kosovaren Mafia unterwandert. Eng verbunden, sind und waren diese kriminellen Clan, auch über den Osmani – Clan in Hamburg vor dem Hamburger Senat, Lobby Vereinen, mit höchsten Deutschen Politikern, denn man wollte ja im Balkan auch Geschäfte machen. Kurz gesagt, spielen Deutsche Politiker, eine wesentliche Rolle, beim Aufbau und der Finanzierung der Drogen- und Menschenschmuggler Netze in Deutschland, was ja den Verantwortlichen auch durch BND Berichte gut bekannt war. Aber auch die Deutschen Autofirmen brauchten Partner vor Ort, wobei die Balkan Mafia Möglichkeiten der Geldwäsche suchten wie u.a. die Familie Stanaj und der Firma Roksped,in Montenegro mit VW. Deutschland spielte eine Schlüsselrolle in den Balkan Ländern bei der Korrumpierung nur damit Geschäfte gemacht werden, wie die hohe Geldstrafe nun auch gegen Mercedes deutlich zeigt.

47 Seiten secret NATO Report, über die Verbrecher Kartelle. Kelmendi, sind wichtige Partner, der Deutschen Politischen Verbrecher Kartelle, welche den Kosovo Krieg organisierten.

Der Bruder von Ramuz Haradinaj, Daut wurde vom ITCY, wegen Entführung, Folterung und Mord verurteilt und auch wegen Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit an Zivilisten und wegen den Grausamkeiten auch durch Vergewaltigungen und Folter!

* Zuhälter in Hamburg mit KFOR Ausweisen der Deutschen Bundeswehr und mit Visa versorgt: Kein Problem für die Hamburger Politik Mafia! Man war ja Kunde in den Edel Bordellen.

LLUKA, KELMENDI, BLJAKAJ und TUZI finanzieren und organisieren Drogen- und Waffenschmuggelkanäle. Die Drogenlieferungen erfolgen vorwiegend aus der Türkei und arabischen Ländern über Albanien, wo HARADINAJ zu Polizei- und Militärkreisen gute Verbindungen hat. Er setzt auch Albaner ein, die in diesem Land leben; der wichtigste war HODERDZHONAJ Mentor aus DECANI (er wurde 2001 wegen Drogenhandels in TIRANA festgenommen).

19 PPDK: Partei des demokratischen Fortschritts Kosovos; weitere Gründungsmitglieder sind:
GRABOVCI Adern (ehemaliger Finanzminister der PGoK), GASHI Ilhami (PPDK-Präsident),
KELMENDI Rexhep
(stellvertretender PPDK-Präsident; sein Bruder, KELMENDI Fetim,
ist TMK-Mitglied und lebt in POCESCE/Kosovo




THACI wird (mit Stand Oktober 2003) über den vmtl. in HAMBURG wohnhaften KELMENDI Mohamed und seinen Bruder Ibrahim49 (*2.8) mit umfassendem Waffen- und Drogenhandel in Verbindung gebracht.

Naser Kelmendi: From Kosovo Inmate to Sarajevo Businessman Print E-mail
Monday, 16 November 2009
By The Center for Investigative Reporting in Sarajevo.
Naser Kelmendi, whose alleged drug dealing has long made him a target of Balkan law enforcement agencies, is facing more scrutiny after SIPA made a special presentation to Interpol in Lyon, France outlining what it calls his criminal network.

Naser Kelmendi

Naser Kelmendi

Three law enforcement agencies in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) have spent years investigating Naser Kelmendi, a Sarajevo businessman who came to the country from Kosovo soon after the war in BiH and built what investigators describe as a Balkan criminal empire.

Kelmendi, his sons and his half-brother, Bećir, run a number of firms in BiH, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo, and do business with some of the region’s big businessmen.

The State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) has collected an extensive dossier on Kelmendi, 52, who they say has a criminal organization with connections to influential people.

Federation of BiH (FBiH) police officials say their colleagues across Europe are acquainted with his history; SIPA officials gave a presentation on Kelmendi to Interpol in Lyon, France in 2008.

Although there have been numerous complaints against him, he has never been to trial in BiH.

balkan-spezial

Medien-Mafia

Am 25. Mai 1998 veröffentlichte die Wochenzeitschrift Dani in Sarajewo einen Artikel über die lokale Medienmafia unter dem Titel “Bosnias Cosa Nostra”. Das Dossier lieferte Profile der wichtigsten Medien-Mafiosi in Bosnien, Beschreibungen ihres Werdeganges und ihrer Verbindungen zu den politischen Parteien usw. Noch am gleichen Tag bewies der Artikel seine Berechtigung, als die JournalistInnen und Chefredaktor Senad Pecanin offene Drohungen erhielten. Ismet Bajramovic Celo, stadtbekanntester Krimineller und einer der reichsten Männer Sarajewos, erschien gleich persönlich mit Bodyguards im Dani-Büro, um sich mit bewaffneten Drohungen für die Erwähnung im Artikel zu bedanken. Die von verbaler Gewalt und Waffendrohungen eingeschüchterten JournalistInnen reichten Strafklage gegen Bajramovic und seine Bodyguards ein. Das Strafmass: 50 Franken! Sie hätten nur Wasserpistolen benützt.

Archiv Medien Hilfe
Mafia Boss von Sarajevo: Ismet Bajramovic-”Celo

Even though he has spent much time in Montenegro and BiH, Kelmendi is still remembered in Kosovo.
Rrahman Sylejmani, aide to the police commissioner of Kosovo, told CIN reporters in the spring of 2008 that, according to his information, Kelmendi would likely be detained if he returned to Kosovo. Sylejmani said he also had information that Kelmendi owed money to Ekrem Luka and other businessmen in Peć.

„We had information that he was not feeling safe in Kosovo because there are criminal organizations here who are rivals,“ explained Sylejmani.

Sarajevo investigators also looked into complaints from rival crime gangs that Kelmendi conspired with Muhamed Ali Gaši in June 2007 to kill Ramiz Delelić (Ćelo)*, a long-time organized crime figure who had clashed with members of the Albanian mafia in Sarajevo for years.

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http://www.reportingproject.net/new/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=503&Itemid=43

MAFIA-STYLE GANG responsible for killing of deputy minister of internal affairs of Bosnia

Globus, Zagreb, Croatia December 24, 1999

“Globus” uncovers the results of the investigation on the assassination of the deputy minister of internal affairs of the BH Federation which was conducted by international police (IPTF)
MAFIA-STYLE GANG OF BAJRAMOVIC “CELO” SUSPECTED OF MURDERING JOZO LEUTAR

By Denis Kuljis and Mark Cigoj
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10/28/99 – An unidentified male and his girlfriend traveled to the regional headquarters of IPTF in Tuzla and asked to speak with someone in charge of investigating the Leutar case. Regional commander Stanislav Frolov and chief of operations Eric Ericson spoke with the subject. They informed the commissioner in Sarajevo who further advised the allied forces regarding the situation. Police monitors Barton and Sigfuson left the same day for Tuzla to conduct an interview. The discussion began at 4:00 p.m. in the office of the deputy regional commander. During the conversation the unidentified person informed IPTF regarding the participants in the murder of Leutar.

He was a former member of that gang and was present at the first meeting when the decision was made to kill Leutar. The subject wanted to withdraw from the gang because of disagreement with Ismet Bajramovic “Celo”. The following persons were listed as being present at the meeting at which the murder was planned: Radzo Mahir, Fikret Kajevic, Nijaz Karkelja “Nisko”, Selver Lekic, Ismet Bajramovic “Celo”, Atko, Aco and Mina. They were offered 100,000 German marks apiece to eliminate Leutar. The meeting was held about the middle of March in the “Estrada” caffe bar in Sarajevo which is owned by Celo. The subject emphatically claimed that he was not a participant in the crime. He said that Leutar was in possession of information regarding the illegal activities of Bakir Izetbegovic. During the meeting, he claims, Bakir Izetbegovic communicated with Celo by telephone and Celo put the call on speaker phone. Bakir stressed that he needed Leutar to be eliminated.

DEATH BECAUSE OF A CASSETTE?

In the “Introductory Report on Discussions and Meetings with Arman Jasarevic” which was composed by Charlene Barton and of which “Globus” possesses a photocopy, it is stated: “The main topic of the first meeting, which was held late in the afternoon on March 2nd or 3rd in the “Estrada” caffe was the murder of Jozo Leutar. All members of the gang were present at the meeting. Two of Celo’s bodyguards were also present but outside the room where the meeting took place, as was Celo’s secretary and girlfriend, Mina. He told us that Celo advised the gang that they would get 500,000 German marks for the murder of Jozo Leutar. During the meeting, Bakir Izetbegovic telephoned Celo and talked about the murder of Leutar. Celo put Bakir on speaker phone to confirm the amount of money and Bakir Izetbegovic said that he would get 500,000 German marks for the murder. Bakir said: “Get this guy off my dick.”

Balkanpeace

Medien-Mafia

Am 25. Mai 1998 veröffentlichte die Wochenzeitschrift Dani in Sarajewo einen Artikel über die lokale Medienmafia unter dem Titel “Bosnias Cosa Nostra”. Das Dossier lieferte Profile der wichtigsten Medien-Mafiosi in Bosnien, Beschreibungen ihres Werdeganges und ihrer Verbindungen zu den politischen Parteien usw. Noch am gleichen Tag bewies der Artikel seine Berechtigung, als die JournalistInnen und Chefredaktor Senad Pecanin offene Drohungen erhielten. Ismet Bajramovic Celo, stadtbekanntester Krimineller und einer der reichsten Männer Sarajewos, erschien gleich persönlich mit Bodyguards im Dani-Büro, um sich mit bewaffneten Drohungen für die Erwähnung im Artikel zu bedanken. Die von verbaler Gewalt und Waffendrohungen eingeschüchterten JournalistInnen reichten Strafklage gegen Bajramovic und seine Bodyguards ein. Das Strafmass: 50 Franken! Sie hätten nur Wasserpistolen benützt.

Archiv Medien Hilfe

Inside Naser Kelmendi

According to BiH State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) records from November 2008, Kelmendi’s most powerful and influential connections, after Kosovo, are in Montenegro where Roko Stanaj is on the top of the list. „Roko Stanaj, controversial Montenegrin busissman, father of Anton who, with his brothers Nuo, Ljubo, Vaso, Simon and Sander, under the „supervision“ of their father Roko, founded family company Rokšped based in Tuzi in Montenegro, which is dealing with the import of tobacco products. They are related to oil and weapons smuggling,“ records say.In May 2011 Roko’s son, Anton was convicted of organizing a criminal group for international cigarette smuggling. See Anton Stanaj’s profile.

http://www.reportingproject.net/PeopleOfInterest/profil.php?profil=18

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